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This paper argues that focusing on short-run income distribution 
effects of tariffs within a
specific factors model provides a much better rationale for the calculation of effective rates of
protection than does the traditional focus on long-run resource reallocation. 
It shows how factor
price and labor market effects can be calculated from effective rates of protection, if facts or
specificity is introduced. Along these lines, the paper also presents some 
empiricalr or
Austrian pre- and post-Tokyo-round tariff protection.
1. Introduction
Traditionally, effective rates of protection have been viewed as indicators
of resource-allocation effects of tariffs. This paper argues that focusing on
short-run income distribution effects of a given protective structure provides
a much better rationale for the calculation of effective rates of protection
than does the traditional focus on long-run reallocation.
Income distribution effects have repeatedly been argued to be or crucial
importance for the formation of trade policy,' but, somewhat surprisingly,
they have not played a prominent role in empirical trade policy analysis.2
The present paper follows up on suggestions by Jones (1975) and Ethier
(1977) in that it links effective rates of protection to income 
distribution in a
A preliminary version of this paper was written while I was visiting the University of
Michigan vDepartment of Economics. Thanks are due to Bela Balassa, Alan Deardorff and
Robert Stern for having read and commented on this preliminary 
version. I also wish to
acknowledge helpful comments by two anonymous referees. I take full responsibility for any
remaining errors. 1 am grateful for financial support received from the 'Fonds zur Forderung der
wissenschaftichen Forschu(, Vienna, through an 'ERWIN-SCHRODINGER' fellowship.
'Mussa (1974), for instance, has argued that a 'primary effect 
and important objective of
commercial policy is frequently to protect or enhance the incomes of specially favored 
groups'
(p. tt9t).
2They have, however, played an important role in political economy models 
of protection. See,
for instance, Pincus (1975) and Mayer (1984).
model with sector-specific capital. As will be shown, this model also allows
the calculation of various labor market effects of tariffs.
As an illustration, the second part of the paper presents some empirical
work on the Austrian economy. There is a severe shortage of detailed
information on the economic effects of Austrian tariff protection. Basically,
the literature and policy discussions have concentrated on the level and
industry-structure of nominal tariff rates.3 No attempt has been made to
investigate the consequences of the structure of Austria's tariff protection.
This paper undertakes such an analysis for pre- and post-Tokyo-round
tariffs. The results presented include the effects of tariffs on rental rates of
sector-specific capital, the wage rate, and sectoral employment.
Section 2 will briefly review the limitations of the traditional interpretation
of effective rates of protection. Section 3 will then show how effective rates of
protection can be linked to changes in income distribution in a specific
factors model. Section 4 will briefly discuss problems arising from non-traded
goods and imperfect substitution between imports and domestic goods.
Section 5 will present the data used, and Section 6 will present the main
empirical results.
2. Effective protection and resource allocation
An economy importing intermediate goods will experience a dual effect of
the introduction or removal of a system of tariffs. In addition to increasing
the degree of import competition, the removal of such a tariff system will
also have the opposite effect of lowering the domestic price of imported
intermediate goods.
The theory of effective protection' proposes a simple formula that allows
one, under certain assumptions, to calculate the net effect of changes in the
tariff system on sectoral per-unit value added. The rationale behind this
approach was that under fixed input-output coefficients these changes in per-
unit value added (called effective rates of protection) would indicate the
direction of gross output changes in a way completely analogous to the way
that nominal prices and tariffs indicate the direction of output changes in a
simpler model without intermediate products [see Ethier (1971 and 1972)].
Thus, it was hoped that calculating effective rates of protection would
provide indicators of 'the direction of resource-allocation effects of a protecti:e
structure' [Corden (1966, p. 227)].
But a theoretical discussion carried out in the early seventies,5 has
'See the comprehensive survey by Breuss (1983), and Breuss and Stankovsky (1988).
'This theory has been pioneered more than twenty years ago by Balassa (1965), Corden (1966)
and Johnson (1965).
'See Corden (1971a), Jones (1971a), Bruno (1973), Khang (1973), and Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1973).
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revealed that this claim could not be maintained in a general equilibrium
model with substitution between produced and primary inputs, unless
production functions are separable with respect to produced and primary
inputs. Without separability, value added ceases to have a natural unit, and
the analogy between nominal tariff rates and effective rates of protection
breaks down. With separable production functions, however, effective rates of
protection can be viewed as prices of the respective value added products,
6
and they will indicate resource reallocation to the production of these
sectoral value added products. But they will do so in a very limited sense. As
with nominal prices in the case without intermediate inputs, all one can say
from a generalized neoclassical model of production with many goods is that
changes in the value added prices (effective rates of protection) and changes
in the value added products will be positively correlated.
7 Thus, it must be
concluded that effective rates of protection as such offer only very limited
information on the reallocation effect of a given change in the tariff system,
and some writers have even argued that they are not worth the effort of their
calculation [see Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973, p. 279-280)].
3. Effective protection and income distribution
Given the importance, both to economic policy makers and to those
affected by protection, of short-run income distribution effects, it appears
natural to ask whether effective rates of protection might be more useful in
shedding some light on income distributional considerations. Jones (1975)
has proposed a formal model with sector-specific capital, which points to a
close link between effective rates of protection and income distribution. In
the same spirit, Ethier (1977, p. 243) and Hartigan (1985, pp. 53-54) have
argued that assuming factor specificity and focusing on income distribution
offers a much more convincing rationale for the calculation of effective rates
of protection than does the traditional focus on resource reallocation.
8
Thus, assume that n commodities are produced with n produced inputs,
sector-specific capital, and completely mobile labor. If all commodities are
domestically produced, there are n (i=1...n) price equations, which can be
differentiated to yield
OSarg+ Ow=pi f j, (1)
61n addition to the literature mentioned in the previous footnote, see Corden (1969), Corden
(1971b), and Ethier (1977).
7This is what has been referred to as the 'generalized production-substitution law' by Ruflin
(1971, p. 102). For a correlation formulation, see Deardorff (1980).
'An income distribution focus similar to the one in this paper can also be found in de Melo
and Robinson (1980), and Abraham, Deardorff and Stern (1988).
where r, and w are rental rates for (sector-specific) capital and (mobile) labor,
ik and Oil are associated distributive shares, and carets indicate relative
changes. Eq. (1) makes use of the unit cost minimization condition that the
price-weighted sum of all changes in input-output coefficients must be zero.
Notice that there are really n + 1 factors, which allows the arbitrary
imposition of (small) changes in all n commodity prices without hitting
corner solutions.9 It should also be pointed out that r, is a residual; sectoral
capital income constitutes economic rent.10 This is perfectly consistent with
the assumption of a uniform profit rate. These would be achieved by
appropriate adjustments of share prices in the stock market [see Dervis, de
Melo and Robinson (1982, p. 171)].
There can be little doubt that capital is sector-specific in the short-run, but
the treatment of labor as being perfectly mobile with a flexible nominal wage
rate may seem less satisfactory. However, the assumption of complete labor
mobility and instantaneous wage adjustment need not be taken literally. As
Neary (1982, p. 44) has pointed out, a somewhat more satisfactory view
would be that the labor market, while not necessarily adjusting instan-
taneously to the new equilibrium, does so before capital reallocation
begins. 1 A 'very short-run' view might even suggest that the nominal wage
rate does not change at all. Accordingly, the following analysis will also
consider the case of a fixed nominal wage.
To relate factor price changes to effective rates of protection, the above
equation can be divided by (1 -- A) to get
1-ZJoL (2)
where 4 i, and 40l now denote the respective factor shares in value added. If
production functions are separable, the right hand side of eq. (2) is what
Corden and others have called the price of the value added product, or the
effective price.'2 To the extent, then, that effective rates of protection can be
taken as approximations of effective price changes, eq. (2) above shows how
they can be linked to short-run income distribution effects.
13
9This is an aspect emphasized by Travis (1968, p. 449) and Anderson (1970, p. 722). For this
reason, almost all the general equilibrium treatments of effective protection have assumed there
to be at least as many factors as there are commodities, without alluding to factor specificity."For this reason, it is preferable to call eq. (1) a price equation rather than a zero profit
condition.
t Neary (1982) actually focuses on a more general case. Rather than imposing a sequential
time pattern of reallocation, he analyses the dynamics that arises if capital and labor are allowed
to move simultaneously, but non-instantaneously."See Corden (1971a, p. 75), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973, p. 269), and Ethier (1977, p. 241).
"An equation similar to (2) above has already been derived by Anderson (1970). However,
unlike the specific factors model, he does not use the mobile factor market clearing condition to
explicitly solve for factor price changes.
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Given there are n +1 factors, n equations of the form (2) will not suffice to
determine the factor price effects of a given structure of protection. But for a
production equilibrium, factor price changes not only have to satisfy the
differentiated price equations, they also have to allow full employment of the
mobile factor. Now, capital specificity implies
Yj- -J,- (3)
where yi and k1 are sectoral outputs and specific capital input-output
coefficients. Moreover, differentiating the full employment condition for given
labor endowment yields
( + j) =0, (4)
where 2 is sector i's employment share, and I, is the sectoral input-output
coefficient for labor. Assuming separable production functions one can use
the familiar definition of the elasticity of capital-labor substitution, o, to get
E ha,(i-Fi)=0, (5)
If all effective price changes are given (see below), this equation plus the n
differentiated price equations form an n +1 linear equation system with n +1
unknowns (n changes of rental rates for specific capital plus the- wage 'rate
change). The analytical solution of. this system is discussed in detail in Jones
(1975).
Instead of using eq. (5), one can also focus on the 'very short-run' by
setting w = 0. In this case, capital owners may calculate the relative change in
their income simply by dividing the relative changes in the value added
prices by their share in value added.
Once relative factor price changes are known, it is relatively easy to
calculate the short-run labor market effects [see also Dervis, de Melo, and
Robinson (1982, p. 205)]. Assuming wage flexibility, the value added product
changes as follows: 4
Vi= oi'-(ri-'). (6)
But with capital being specific in the short-run, i=#ufiLi, where Li is the
"If the value added product, u,, is produced under separable production functions with
minimal cost, then 4k,+0lI,=0 for all i, where ki and L are specific capital and mobile labor
input coefficients of the production function v,(f ). Moreover, with given amounts of specific
capital in every sector, i0= -Ik. These two expressions, together with the definition of og, yield
eq. (6).
total labor input in good i production, receiving a wage rate equal to the
marginal value product. Hence
L,= , (r,-w).(7)
Thus, depending on whether a sector's specific capital rental increases
more or less, proportionally, than the nominal wage rate, value added
production and labor employment will increase or decrease in that sector.'"
Eq. (7) can, furthermore, be used to characterize labor market disequili-
brium for w = 0, that is for the 'very short-run'. In this case, of course, i, also
has to be calculated under the assumption of a rigid nominal wage, i.e.,
setting w = 0 instead of imposing the factor market clearing condition (4).
Sectors with decreasing value added prices will also experience falling rental
rates to specific capital, and they will want to cut down on their employ-
ment, in order to get labor's marginal value added product in line with the
given wage rate. On the other hand, sectors with an increased effective price
will be frustrated in their efforts to increase employment. Calculating these
labor market effects appears very useful for commercial policy since it will
reveal the industry breakdown of the momentary excess demand for labor
that will eventually lead to a change in the wage rate as represented by the
solution of eqs. (2) and (5).
4. From tariff changes to price changes
The above model does not include any specification of the demand side of
the economy. It is a pure production model, in which all commodity price
changes are treated as exogenous. They are assumed to be determined by a
given change in commercial policy. In the base case of the following
empirical analysis, they have been set equal to the changes in the respective
tariff rates. This implies that imported goods are perfect substitutes for goods
produced at home and, furthermore, that the home country is too small to
influence world prices.
The small country assumption seems reasonable for the present case, but
assuming perfect substitutability is certainly less satisfactory. If substitutabi-
lity is, in fact, imperfect, domestic prices will to some extent be autonomous
from import prices, and the degree of this autonomy will vary from sector to
sector. For instance, if a sector has a heavy export orientation and its firms
are price takers on world markets, then a tariff on competing imports will
not allow them to raise prices. On the other hand, they will be affected by
"'It is this property of Jones' model that Corden (1985, pp. 143-145) has recently invoked to
rehabilitate effective rates of protection also as indicators of resource reallocation.
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tariff induced increases in imported input prices.'6 Against this background,
alternative calculations have been carried out assuming complete autonomy
of domestic prices, i.e., assuming that tariff changes, as such, do not lead to
any changes in prices for domestic goods. To save space, however, the
presentation of results below .will be restricted to the case of perfect
substitutability. Other results can be obtained upon request.
An analogous assumption was also employed regarding non-traded goods
prices. This is what has become known as the Balassa method in the effective
protection literature. Given the focus on short-run income distribution
effects, this seemed to be preferable to the alternative assumption of a full
pass through of all tariff induced cost effects on non-traded goods prices
(Corden method)."
5. The data
The results to be presented have been obtained using the Austrian
input-output table for 1976.'8 This table has a 48 sector classification, of
which 37 are sectors producing traded goods (including agriculture), hence-
forth called the merchandise sectors. Of the services sectors, 5 reveal a
substantial amount of (tariff-) free trade, and the rest are non-tradable
sectors, including the public sector. The presentations below will always first
list the merchandise sectors, followed by the tradable services sectors, and
then conclude with the non-tradable sectors. They will not however, include
the public sector, since its input structure is not disclosed by the input-
output table.
Pre-Tokyo-round tariff rates were calculated from a vector of tariff
revenues" and a vector of sectoral imports, both pertaining to 1976 and
corresponding to the input-output classification. This implies that imports
"See de Melo and Robinson (1981, pp. 170-173) for a formal analysis substantiating this
point. Ideally, the present model should be extended to include a detailed specification of
imported - home goods substitution, such as the one suggested by de Melo and Robinson.
Unfortunately, this was beyond present data availability.
7A complete specification of demand for and production of non-traded goods would allow an
endogenous determination of their price changes from a given change in tariffs. Again, this was
beyond present data availability. For a more detailed characterization of the Balassa and
Corden methods of treating non-traded goods prices in the calculation of effective rates of
protection, see Kohler (1989). Results obtained employing the Corden method can be obtained
upon request."This is the most recent table available for Austria. Thanks are due to Josef Richter at the
Federal Chamber of Commerce in Vienna for having made all the data available in machine
readable form.
'Tariff revenues include some minor commodity taxes that are collected together with tariffs.
Some of these are uniform across all sectors and hence do not distort the results. Others,
however, are sector specific, but still of comparatively minor importance. Unfortunately, tariff
revenues vetted from these taxes have not been available. -Upon consulting the statistics
department of the Chamber of Commerce, it was, however, possible to identify those sectors
which are likely to show upward-biased tariff revenues. These are agriculture, petroleum, other
foodstuff, and beverages.
are used as weights to obtain tariff averages. Using import weights for tariff
averaging is quite common in empirical trade policy research, but it has long
been recognized to most probably involve a downward bias in the averages
obtained.20
Post-Tokyo-round tariff averages were calculated using the above men-
tioned pre-Tokyo-round rates and the tariff cutting formula agreed upon in
the Tokyo-round tariff negotiations. A detailed description of this procedure
and its justification as well as possible problems can be found in the
appendix.
For the specific factors model application, wage value added and non-wage
value added data as well as employment figures have been used, all of which
were available directly in the required industry breakdown in the present
data set. The same holds true for labor's and capital's shares in value
added.2 '
As is common practice in empirical trade policy research, literature
estimates of primary factor substitution elasticities have been used in the
calculations to be presented below. Two sets of runs were done correspond-
ing to 'high' and 'low' elasticity values.22 The difference in results was
marginal and to save space only those obtained for 'low' elasticity values will
be presented. Other results can be obtained upon request.
6. Results
The above data have been used to calculate two sets of effective rates of
protection, one for pre-Tokyo-round tariffs and one for post-Tokyo-round
tariffs.2 3 And these effective rates were then used to solve the specific factors
model for relative changes in factor rewards and employment, as shown in.
section 3. To save space, the effective rates will not be presented here; they
can be obtained upon request.
What is perhaps worth mentioning is that the results reveal the well
2 0This is most easily understood by considering a prohibitive tariff, which would receive a
zero weight. However, employing an aggregation scheme different from the one implicit in the
use of tariff revenues would require going down to the line item level of the tariff nomenclature,
usually comprising several thousand items. Not only would this be computationally burdensome,
but it is also highly unlikely that anything other than imports would be available for weighting
purposes on that level.
2 1Capital's share in value added is gross of depreciation. This should be borne in mind when
interpreting the results presented below as incentives to long-run capital reallocation along the
lines suggested by Neary (1982).
2 2Elasticity estimates were taken from Deardorff and Stern (1986, pp. 42-43), Mansur and
Whalley (1984, p. 105), and Harrison (1986, p. 106). The values presented by Deardorff and
Stern tend to be higher, on average, than those reported by Harrison. A technical appendix on
problems of concordance and how they were resolved can be obtained upon request.
"In all these calculations, the intermediate input shares (Oji) have been adjusted for the price
effects of protection, as suggested by the theory of effective protection. See, for instance, Corden
(1966, p. 234) and Corden (1971b, p. 37).
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known phenomenon of tariff escalation: On average, effective rates of
protection calculated under the usual assumption that home goods are
perfect substitutes for imported goods are higher (output-weighted average:
5.9 percent before and 3.6 percent after the Tokyo-round) than nominal
tariffs (4 percent before and 2.6 percent after the Tokyo-round). At the same
time their dispersion is also higher than that of nominal tariffs, indicating
that the tariff induced production distortions are higher than what one might
have thought upon a mere inspection of nominal rates. It might also be of
some interest to note that there is no correlation between effective rates and
either the labor share in sectoral value added or the share of sectoral
employment in total labor. But an explicit solution of the specific factors
model will no doubt shed much more light on possible adjustment problems
that labor might face in the case of liberalization.
Tables 1 and 2 present the results obtained by solving the specific factors
model for relative changes in factor rewards and employment, using pre- and
post-Tokyo-round effective rates of protection as effective price changes.
Both tables assume that domestic and imported goods within every sector
are perfect substitutes.24 With their signs reversed, these results can be
interpreted as the effects of a unilateral removal of the respective tariff
systems on rental rates of specific capital, sectoral employment and the wage
rate.
Column 1 of both tables gives the values for the primary factor substitu-
tion elasticities used in the computations. Column 2 contains sectoral
percentage changes in rental rates of capital under the assumption of a
flexible nominal wage rate, whereas column 3 assumes a fixed nominal wage.
Column 4 gives the percentage changes in employment under the assumption
of a flexible nominal wage rate, whereas column 5 contains the sectoral
breakdown of excess demand for labor that will eventually bring about the
wage rate change mentioned at the bottom of each table.
Both the pre- ani post-Tokyo-round tariff structure of the Austrian
economy seems to have had a moderate nominal wage increasing effect. This
is an interesting feature since, as mentioned above, a simple correlation
analysis of effective rates might have led one to conclude that effective
protection was not directed towards labor intensive sectors or sectors with a
large employment share. However, since most nominal tariffs exceed the
nominal wage increase, one is inclined to conclude that tariff protection
causes a real wage loss.
By and large, specific capital in the sectors with negative effective
protection is also shown to suffer a loss in its rental rate. It is interesting to
note that even moderate nominal tariffs can have a sizable effect on specific
24As mentioned above, the corresponding results for the assumption of unchanged prices for
domestic goods can be obtained upon request.
148 Table 1
Income- and employment effects (in percent) of Austrian pre-Tokyo-round tariff protection
assuming perfect substitutability between home goods and imports.'
Change in capital rental Change in employment
flex. wage fixed wage flex. wage fixed wage
Sector Subst. el. Value R Value R Value R Value 'R
Merchandise sectors
01 Agric./Forest. 0.61 10.19 12 10.40 14 5.27 15 6.31 19
02 Mining 0.50 0.85 25 4.59 22 -0.33 25 2.29 23
03 Petroleum 0.50 1.60 24 1.93 25 0.04 24 0.97 26
04 Stones 0.83 8.15 15 10.34 15 5.50 14 8.56 15
05 Cement 1.54 -4.06 37 -2.76 38 -8.58 41 -4.25 42
06 Glass 1.27 9.37 14 11.77 13 9.96 11 14.91 12
07 Meat 0.79 -20.50 46 -18.14 46 -17.36 46 -14.31 46
08 Mills 0.79 -11.53 44 -9.76 43 -10.29 43 -7.70 43
09 Bakery 0.79 105.58 2 108.35 2 82.11 2 85.49 2
10 Sugar 0.79 -2.93 33 -0.38 31 -3.50 37 -0.30 32
11 Milk 0.79 61.14 3 63.39 3 47.05 3 50.02 4
12 Other foodst. 0.79 -0.30 28 1.69 26 -1.43 28 1.33 24
13 Beverages 0.66 175.78 1 177.35 1 114.49 1 116.52 1
14 Tobacco 0.85 0.64 26 0.75 28 -0.73 26 0.63 28
15 Textiles 0.91 14.54 10 18.71 10 11.91 10 17.10 10
16 Clothing 1.11 43.55 S 46.94 5 46.50 4 51.91 3
17 Leather/Footw. 0.94 21.08 7 24.32 7 18.40 6 22.86 6
18 Chemicals 0.83 5.58 19 7.75 21 3.37 18 6.41 17
19 Iron/Steel 1.14 9.66 13 14.60 11 9.31 12 16.66 11
20 Machinery 0.68 1.82 23 4.43 23 0.21 22 3.00 22
21 Ships/Locom. 0.34 2.03 22 3.62 24 0.18 23 1.25 25
22 Casting 1.14 5.33 21 8.32 20 4.36 17 9.49 14
23 Non-iron metals 0.81 -3.05 35 -0.51 33 -3.68 39 -0.41 34
24 Ir./Met. prod. 0.81 7.79 17 10.04 17 5.06 16 8.09 16
25 Precis. engin. 0.66 5.55 20 9.66 18 2.68 20 6.40 18
26 Electr. motors 0.52 29.03 6 34.51 6 14.34 9 17.98 9
27 Electr. wires 0.52 48.24 4 51.01 4 24.35 5 26.57 5
28 Oth. el. prod. 0.52 7.60 18 10.25 16 3.17 19 5.34 20
29 Radio/Telev. 0.52 -2.96 34 -0.77 35 -2.33 33 -0.40 33
30 Motor vehicles 0.34 7.80 16 9.43 19 2.16 21 3.24 21
31 Sawing 0.93 -23.38 47 -21.32 47 -23.02 47 -19.73 47
32 Lumber boards 0.85 -12.81 45 -10.16 44 -12.20 44 -8.66 44
33 Wood process. 0.83 10.92 11 13.63 12 7.85 13 11.37 13
34 Paper 0.91 18.59 9 21.54 9 15.51 8 19.56 8
35 Paper process. 0.91 19.24 8 21.65 8 16.10 7 19.66 7
36 Graphics 0.81 -2.41 32 0.85 27 -3.17 36 0.69 27
37 Electricity 0.36 -1.50 30 -0.68 34 -1.08 27 -0.24 31
Traded services
38 Commerce 0.97 -1.72 31 -0.48 32 -3.13 35 -0.46 35
39 Transp./Commun. 0.97 -6.45 40 -1.32 36 -7.72 40 - 1.28 39
40 Bank./Insur. 0.97 -1.12 29 -0.15 30 -2.55 34 -0.14 30
41 Hotels/Restaur. 0.97 -11.26 43 -10.28 45 -12.38 45 -9.97 45
42 Other services 0.97 -9.10 42 -3.14 40 -10.29 42 -3.04 41
Non-traded services
43 Mot. veh. repairs 0.34 -8.69 41 -6.88 42 -3.51 38 -2.37 40
44 Constr. 0.32 -4.71 39 -2.19 37 -2.01 32 -0.71 36
45 Constr. access. 0.32 -4.59 38 -3.33 41 -1.98 31 -1.08 37
46 Gas/Water 0.36 -3.74 36 -3.08 39 -1.89 30 -1.11 38
47 Housing 0.97 -0.27 27 -0.14 29 -1.73 29 -0.13 29
"Relative change in wage rate (if assumed to be flexible): 1.5 percent. R indicates Rank.
Elasticities of primary factor substitution in the production of value added, taken from
Deardorff and Stern (1986, pp. 42-43), Harrison (1986, p. 106), and Mansur and Whalley (1984,
p. 105). See text for more details.
Table 2 149
Income- and employment effects (in percent) of Austrian pre-Tokyo-round tariff protection
assuming perfect substitutability between home goods and imports.'
Change in capital rental Change in employment
flex. wage fixed wage flex. wage fixed wage
Sector Subst. el. Value R Value R Value R Value R






































































































































































































































































































































































































































capital rental. The sectors most favorably affected by protection are bever-
ages, bakery, milk, electric wires, clothing, leather and footwear, paper, and
paper processing. This result appears to be driven by comparatively high
nominal tariff rates. Within this group the unweighted average nominal tariff
rate is 12.5% compared to 4.4% for the overall average. Besides non-traded
goods, the sectors adversely affected by protection are sawing, lumber
boards, meat, mills, non-iron metals, and radio and television. Again, this is
driven by nominal tariff rates, which average to 1.2% within this group. The
rank order of sectors in terms of changes in rental rates of capital is more or
less the same before and after the Tokyo-round.
Tables 1 and 2 also nicely reflect the common interest shared by labor and
capital in every sector.2 5 Even though the given tariff structure is revealed to
most likely have a real wage reducing effect, one would not necessarily
expect to find labor equally lobbying for liberalization across sectors. The
reason for this can be found in the final columns of tables 1 and 2. They
show the sectoral breakdown of excess labor demand that will eventually
bring about the wage decrease. If there are adjustment costs that labor has
to bear, one might expect that labor in sectors adversely affected by
liberalization might join sector specific capital in its opposition to such
liberalization. The reverse argument holds for sectors, in which capital is
shown to be adversely affected by protection. Thus, by looking at the
sectoral breakdown of excess labor demand rather than the wage rate effect
alone, it is possible to explain why labor exhibits sector-specific lobbying
behavior rather than taking a uniform position on protection issues.26
7. Concluding remarks
It is generally accepted that knowing the short-run income distribution
effects of protection is very important for a complete understanding of
individual industries' attitudes towards trade policy issues. The present paper
argued that effective rates of protection, traditionally viewed as indicators of
long-run resource allocation, should be much more fruitfully seen as
indicators of such short-run income distribution effects. It was shown how a
specific factors model can be used with comparatively little data efforts to
calculate factor price changes from effective rates of protection. The same
model also allows the calculation of the sectoral breakdown of momentary
excess labor demand attendant upon the introduction or removal of a tariff
"See Magee (1978) for an empirical demonstration of the fact, running counter to the
distribution properties of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, that capital and labor perceive themselves
as sharing a common fate regarding protection issues."Baldwin (1984, p. 63) has noted the difficulty that specific factors may encounter in trying to
find support for protectionist lobbying efforts from the mobile factor, if the latter can expect to
gain from protection. The argument above amounts to relaxing the assumption of complete
mobility somewhat.
Non-traded services
43 Mot. veh. repairs 0.34 -6.92 44 -5.71 44 -2.73 39 -1.96 40
44 Constr. 0.32 -3.56 38 -1.88 37 -1.48 33 -0.61 36
45 Constr. access. 0.32 -3.67 39 -2.82 41 -1.52 34 -0.91 37
46 Gas/Water 0.36 -3.22 37 -2.78 40 -1.52 35 -1.00 38
47 Housing 0.97 -0.21 29 -0.12 31 -1.18 31 -0.11 32
'Relative change in wage rate (if assumed to be flexible): 1 percent. R indicates Rank.
Elasticities of primary factor substitution in the production of value added, taken from
Deardorff and Stern (1986, pp. 42-43), Harrison (1986, p. 106), and Mansur and Whalley (1984,
p. 105). See text for more details.
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system. And these factor price and labor market effects can significantly add
to the understanding of industry-specific lobbying behavior for or against
protection.
The paper also presented an empirical illustration for the case of Austrian
pre- and post-Tokyo round tariff protection. The results reported appear to
be particularly important, given the very limited attempts undertaken so far
to systematically investigate the economic effects of Austrian tariff protection.
Appendix
Extending the analysis to post-Tokyo-round tariffs
While pre-Tokyo-round tariff averages were readily available in the
required industry break-down through tariff revenues and import data,
comparable information was not available for Austrian post-Tokyo-round
tariff rates. Instead, use was made of the Tokyo-round tariff cutting formula
to calculate approximations to the post-Tokyo-round tariff rates.
One of the central features of the tariff negotiations of the Tokyo-round
was to approach the issue in an across the board manner, trying to find
agreement on an overall tariff-cutting formula, rather than trying to table
item-by-item offers. This approach had already characterized the so-called
Kennedy-round of tariff negotiations, whereas earlier rounds featured an
item-by-item tabling.
The Tokyo-round negotiations placed much emphasis on 'tariff harmoniza-
tion', finally leading to the so-called 'Swiss formula':
14to 1
14+to'
where t 1 and to are pre- and post-Tokyo-round tariff rates, each expressed in
percent.' The E.E.C. was allowed to employ the constant 176 instead of 14
in the above formula [see, for instance, Winham (1986, p. 201)].
The actual tariff cuts did not, of course, follow this formula in every single
case. There were extensive negotiations on exceptions to the formula.
However, the logic of multilateral tariff negotiations, essentially being that of
reciprocity, i.e., an exchange of benefits between participating nations, implies
that a small country will not find much scope of negotiating exceptions to an
27This is important, since applying the formula to tariffs expressed in percentage figures
divided by 100 would result in negligible tariff-cuts.
agreed upon formula. It simply does not have enough benefits to offer in
terms of the amount of other countries' trade affected by its own proposed
tariff-cuts.
On the other hand, the final tariff-cuts offered by a small country may
depend on the outcome of negotiations between 'major players'. In the case
of the Tokyo-round these major players were the U.S. and the E.E.C., who
entered lengthy negotiations in which each of the players tried to secure from
the other a maximum of tariff-cuts on products important to himself.
Naturally, the cutting-formula that had been agreed upon prior to these
negotiations acted as a constraint. The U.S., for instance, proposed the
concept of 'no net exceptions', meaning that larger than formula cuts should
balance out the exceptions sought [see Winham (1986, p. 204)]. Notice that
such a concept implies an application of the formula on some higher level of
aggregation, and in the process of negotiations, such aggregation was
frequently performed on a 'duty collected basis' [see Winham (1986, p. 266)].
This is exactly the approach followed in the present paper.
Winham (1986, pp. 200-205, and pp. 256-268) gives a detailed account of
these negotiations between the E.E.C. and the U.S., and from there it is clear
where most exceptions to the formula were sought: textiles, chemicals, paper,
steel, electronics, and trucks. In the end, virtually all the greater than formula
cuts that had been offered for certain products at earlier stages, came off the
table rather quickly, while the less than formula cuts for other products were
left in place. The result was that the 'final tariff package on both sides was
smaller than the formula would have produced' [see Winham (1986, p. 204)].
To the extent, then, that the Austrian offer followed that of the E.E.C., one
would expect that using the tariff-cutting formula (15) to calculate post-
Tokyo-round from pre-Tokyo-round tariffs leads to an overstatement of the
tariff-cuts, particularly for the sectors just mentioned. But any application of
the above formula to aggregates like the present 48 sectors will partially
offset the bias just mentioned if, in fact, the formula has been used on some
lower level of aggregation, say the line item level. This is because the formula
is a concave function. The upward bias will be the higher the more dispersed
the initial individual tariff rates within a given sector, and the more uniform
the distribution of imports within that sector.
Thus we have two biases in opposite directions, and one can hope that the
use of eq. (1) above to calculate post-Tokyo-round tariff averages will lead to
a reasonable approximation of the post-Tokyo-round situation.
It should also be pointed out that this procedure will only give an
approximate picture of the average post-Tokyo round tariff rates as they
would have been without any change in the commodity and country mix of
imports. Accordingly, the analysis will only capture 'pure' tariff effects, and it
will leave out of consideration the effects of any changes in the commodity
and/or country composition of imports. Such changes have, of course, in fact
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taken place, both due to the tariff changes themselves and independently. But
calculating the 'pure' tariff effects is nevertheless a useful exercise.
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